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This paper studies the effect of board of directors’ network on firms’ financial reporting quality. 
Networked directors share information and knowledge to facilitate their monitoring and advising 
roles. One of two competing hypotheses on director networks posits that directors gain expertise 
by learning from their peers in a network and therefore become better monitors and advisors in 
their firms (learning hypothesis). The other hypothesis argues that networks are channels of 
information  transmission (including information about bad behavior) therefore undesirable 
corporate practices diffuse among firms through networks of corporate executives and directors 
(contagion hypothesis). Using a sample of S&P1500 firms from 1996 to 2013 and discretionary 
accruals as proxy for financial reporting quality, I find evidence supporting the contagion 
hypothesis after controlling for growth, size, leverage, volatility in firm operations and corporate 
governance indicators. In addition, I find that directors’ networks propagate earnings 
management more if directors receive equity compensation. Finally, I report future performance 
declines following periods of high discretionary accruals.  
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Recent accounting and finance literature on social network theory explain how information 
flow, resource exchange and diffusion of corporate practices occur through corporate networks.1 
Financial reporting quality however has been scant in the context of social networks. The 
influence of director networks on financial reporting quality is very important because the 
regulations provide much reporting discretion to managers (ultimately directors) and this is more 
likely to induce opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting; a behavior that can easily 
spread among related firms. Directors can learn from their interaction with other directors, and 
better monitor financial reports prepared by managers of their firms thereby decreasing the 
incidence of opportunistic financial manipulation in their firms. The effect of director networks 
on earnings manipulation can be either way. The few studies on the possibility of executive 
networks affecting the quality of financial reports are limited to fraudulent accounting 
restatements and options-backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, & Whitby, 2009; Omer, Shelley, & Tice, 
2014a).   
Earnings management has been extensively studied with focus on the incentives for 
managing earnings and institutional setup within which earnings are mostly managed (Cohen, 
Dey, & Lys, 2008; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003), but the social structure within which the 
phenomenon is practiced has largely been ignored. Firms have similar behavior patterns as a 
result of information exchange among them. The observed herding behavior of firms can be 
                                                          
1The influence of corporate executives’ networks on investment decisions (El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015; 
Renneboog & Zhao, 2014; Singh & Schonlau, 2009),  tax planning (Brown & Drake, 2013), firm performance and 
firm value (Chuluun, Prevost, & Puthenpurackal, 2014; Larcker, So, & Wang, 2013), and executive compensation 















explained by social network theory which predicts firms to imitate others with perceived superior 
information (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). 
Prior director network literature posits that through information exchange, directors learn 
from their peers how to better perform their monitoring or advising roles to create value firm 
value (Chuluun et al., 2014; Larcker et al., 2013). Directors can develop their monitoring 
expertise by linking up with other directors who are more experienced and connected to other 
experienced directors. Based on this reasoning, I develop the learning hypothesis, which posits 
that through their networks, directors become better monitors of financial reports produced by 
managers of their firms. The basic assumption here is that directors may be individually experts 
at their work but information exchange among them can at least improve their individual 
expertise or aid their decision making.  
In spite of the value enhancing effect of director network, some studies argue that social 
networks including director networks are channels for diffusion of bad corporate practices. There 
is a likelihood of imitating a bad act when those engaged in the act remain unnoticed/unpunished 
after a long time, because the initial observers subsequently discount the cost of being caught and 
are enticed to actively engage in the act (Marvin & Shigeru, 2006). Social interactions are 
platforms through which information about undesirable corporate practices can be exchanged. 
Davis (1991) documents the diffusion of poison pills adopted among US firms in the late 1980s 
where directors network was identified as the transmission channel. Similarly, options 
backdating was reportedly imitated by firms who shared directors with firms that engaged in the 
practice (Bizjak et al., 2009). Directors carry information about such and other bad corporate 
practices to their firms. I therefore develop my contagion hypothesis following this argument. 















assume that directors take the final responsibility for various corporate practices including 
financial reporting.  
Newman (2010) indicates that complete information exchange extends beyond direct interaction 
between two individuals. The power of a director’s information access from his/her network also 
depends on the link with other connected directors and the position of the director on the 
information path linking others. The objective of my study is to explore the effect of director 
networks on financial reporting quality. I use various aspects of directors’ networks (culminating 
into firm-level network measures) to proxy for firm network and earnings management through 
discretionary accruals to represent financial reporting quality.  
Using a sample of 1899 U.S. firms for the period of 1996-2013, I examine the two 
competing hypotheses and document that earnings management behavior spreads among linked 
firms. The results are robust to the inclusion of governance controls that seek to influence 
managerial behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). I also find that when directors have equity 
stake in their firms, there is a stronger influence of the network on the level of earnings 
management. My results indicate that current levels of earnings management reduce future firm 
performance in the following two years. As additional tests, my results are robust to tests for the 
endogeneity of the network measures and I also find that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002 constrained the earnings management behavior of firms in my sample.    
This study contributes to the literature in many ways. First, earnings management has been 
studied in prior literature with little focus on the social structure within which the practice occurs. 
To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to document a comprehensive effect of 
directors’ network on earnings management through discretionary accruals. My study highlights 















closest attempt which previous studies have made is to relate accounting restatements to board 
interlocks (Chiu, Teoh, & Tian, 2012) but Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2014) indicate the 
limitations in using restatement as proxies for financial report manipulation especially when a 
researcher relies more on available databases. They showed that current available databases are 
not timely and do not capture real financial manipulators. I choose earnings management through 
discretionary accruals as my proxy for financial reporting quality. Discretionary accruals is more 
subtle and widely used in accounting research as a proxy for earnings management.  
Secondly, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature by proposing that the 
monitoring role of directors is undermined when they are highly networked with other directors 
who may be CEOs in other firms. Increased networking offer directors access to more complete 
information to help their decision making. The ease of information access improves the 
independence of directors and they can better play their monitoring role. However, increased 
director networking also comes with potentially increased familiarity with other directors who 
may be linked with the managers they oversee. Such familiarity undermines the independence of 
directors who are unable to fully play their roles as independent monitors.  
The third contribution of this study is that equity incentives do not necessarily align director 
and shareholders’ interests. Through their networks, directors identify with other directors and 
possibly CEOs whose firms manage earnings to maximize the value of their (directors) equity in 
the short-term (Q. Cheng & Warfield, 2005). The common identification makes directors to 
superintend over the earnings management practice in their firms. Finally, this study points out to 
investors how directors’ networks relate to the financial transparency of their firms and the 















obscuring the true economic fundamentals of their firms at least for the short term. The long term 
implication is a discount of firm value.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present a 
description of the network centrality of directors and firms as well as a review of prior earnings 
management literature leading to my hypotheses. Section three discusses my empirical design, 
sampling procedure and measurement of variables. Section four reports results of empirical 



























2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section reviews literature on social networks related to corporate directors and 
economic consequences of their connections for the firm. I also develop my hypotheses based on 
the linkage between social networks and financial reporting quality.  
2.1. Director networks 
Social network theory suggests that individual behavior is an outcome of social interactions 
and this extends to corporate behavior as well (Jackson, 2008; Newman, 2010). Individuals and 
their common social interactions or links form a network across which they share information 
and other resources, which are useful for their decision making. Under uncertain conditions 
(which is typical of firms), it is useful to observe behaviors of others, especially those perceived 
to have superior or more complete information (Marvin & Shigeru, 2006). Social networks serve 
as conduits for the transmission of information about corporate practices culminating into 
herding behavior (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1998; Hirshleifer & Hong Teoh, 2003). 
A direct link between two firms (for example through shared directorates, trade partners, 
and etc.) serves as a natural channel for information sharing, however, the source of or access to 
a complete information extends beyond direct connections. Newman (2010) provides how two 
individuals who are not directly linked can assess information from each through a third 
individual to which they are both linked. A director with several links to others serves as an 
information hub making him/her very indispensable or powerful in the network. Such power or 
indispensability is referred to as centrality in network literature (Jackson, 2008). A direct link to 















who links up with the indispensable information hub can trickle down needed information, 
however the closer or more direct link a director has with the information hub, the better.  
In an attempt to represent the different but related dimensions of networks, four popular 
measures have been adopted in social network studies – degree, eigenvector, betweenness and 
closeness centralities. Degree centrality is a comprehensive measure of the number of direct ties 
an individual has with others. Information access is expected to increase with degree centrality 
therefore one with many direct connections is more central (powerful) in the network. An 
individual’s connection to a more powerful member of a network increases his information 
access. The indirect connection and information retrieval from a bunch of others through ones 
link with a powerful member with numerous links is represented by eigenvector centrality. 
Betweenness centrality connotes a network member’s control of information flow. In a network, 
an individual positioned between two others serving as the medium of information exchange 
between them is viewed as one controlling information flow. Closeness centrality refers to the 
shortest possible path or link on which information access is optimal. Closeness centrality 
measures how quick information from other members of a network gets to an individual. The 
closer an individual is to a source of information, the more efficient and easier it is to access the 
information (Jackson, 2008; Newman, 2010). 
Prior corporate network studies focused largely on board interlocks which is akin to degree 
centrality (Bizjak et al., 2009). But a firm’s complete information access from a network extends 
beyond shared directorates. Corporate practitioners such as board of directors are experts at their 
jobs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and do not merely imitate others, one can appreciate the need 
for complete information access. From his/her network, a director actively gathers relevant 















Incorrect information gathered from a member of a network can be corrected by more precise 
information from other links in the network, leading to an active decision making process.    
2.2. Director networks and earnings management 
Financial reports provide information about a firm’s economic performance. Accounting 
numbers especially earnings are crucial for economic decisions (e.g. capital provision, 
managerial compensation, tax obligations, etc.) of a firm’s stakeholders. Firm insiders reserve 
some level of discretion or judgment in reporting economic outcomes of their firms. Managers 
have been reported to have put out misleading financial reports to opportunistically influence 
contractual outcomes (Healy & Wahlen, 1999) or as a disclosure strategy to obfuscate the 
information environment of their firms (P. Cheng, Man, & Yi, 2013; Verrecchia, 1983).  
Extant literature documents the motives for earnings management such as personal gain and 
self-preservation to loss mitigation. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Q. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) indicate financial gains (equity sales) of managers who manipulate earnings 
successfully. Managers sometimes manage earnings to maintain their jobs especially in very 
competitive environments (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Singh, 2013). Other reasons why managers 
engage in earnings management are to avoid capital markets discounting the value of their firms 
(Allayannis & Weston, 2003; Hong, Huseynov, & Zhang, 2014) and limit information 
asymmetry by smoothing out earnings (Soon & Wee, 2011).  
Prior research also documents events and environment which influence the extent of 
earnings management. Earnings management has appeared around initial public offers, seasoned 
equity offerings and acquisitions (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik, 















documented in  P. Cheng et al. (2013) and Datta et al. (2013). The level of discretionary accruals 
and the disappearance of zero-earnings discontinuity decline after the passage of  the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) (Cohen et al., 2008; Gilliam, Heflin, & Paterson, 2014) highlight the influence 
of institutional environment on earnings management.  
2.3. Research gap, objective and contribution 
To date, little is known about whether earnings management is a herding behavior of firms, 
similar to the popular poison pill adoption and options backdating by firms (Bizjak et al., 2009; 
Davis, 1991). Also whether timely information access and exchange by boards of directors can 
counter the level of financial sophistication exhibited by managers who engage in earnings 
management.  
The objective of this study is to explore the effects of information assessed from the 
networks of directors on financial reporting quality. With this study, I seek to highlight the social 
structure within which financial reporting occurs and the effects of such structure on the quality 
of financial reports. This study also has implications for corporate governance practitioners. 
Knowledge of the effect of directors’ networks – improving/lowering the quality of financial 
reporting will inform decisions on the appointment of directors considering their monitoring and 
advising roles. 
2.4. Hypotheses development 
2.4.1. Earnings management and networks of board of directors 
Boards of directors have two major roles in protecting the interest of firm owners – 
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